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Overview
Electricity use in Australia is falling. From the 1960s to the end of 
the 20th century, electricity consumption increased at an average 
annual rate of six per cent. Investment in power stations and 
electricity networks also rose steadily. Since 2009, however, 
eastern  states’  electricity production has fallen and in Western 
Australia growth has plateaued since 2011. 
Yet this extraordinary fall in demand has not led to a fall in price, 
as would occur in a conventional market. Since 2006 the average 
household has reduced power use by more than seven per cent. 
But in that period the average household power bill has risen 
more than 85 per cent: from $890 to $1660 a year. One reason is 
that Australians are funding billions of dollars of infrastructure that 
falling consumption has made redundant. These price rises are 
unsustainable, but who will pay for the correction: power 
companies, governments or – once again – consumers?  
Falling consumption has several causes. Customers are 
responding to high prices by reducing use or switching to a new 
breed of more energy-efficient appliances. The cost of solar 
energy has fallen: a million households now have solar PV panels 
on their roofs. The economy has become less energy intensive as 
the manufacturing sector has declined.  
The  nature  of  Australia’s  energy  market means that these 
changes are not leading to lower prices. Electricity generators 
operate in a free market: when consumption falls they must 
produce power at a lower price in order to sell it, or reduce 
production. But network businesses – which carry power from the 
generator to the business or home and which take about 
45 per cent of a  household’s  electricity bill – are regulated 
monopolies not subject to market forces.  
For years, regulators have allowed these companies to earn 
excessive profits by setting tariffs that are too high given the low 
risk they face as monopolies. Some states have also allowed the 
companies to overinvest in infrastructure. This was less of a 
problem when demand was rising and higher costs were spread 
over a larger volume of sales. But when electricity use falls, the 
high cost of the network is spread over a smaller volume and 
customers pay more. Continually rising prices could induce them 
to disconnect from the network. Enough disconnections would 
trigger a crisis that insiders call the ‘death spiral’. 
To prevent this from happening governments must: 
x Ensure that network companies make future investments 
that better match future power needs. 
x Begin the hard task of reforming network tariffs so that 
prices companies charge reflect the costs they incur.  
x Review the value of network assets to decide who should 
pay for any write-down of surplus infrastructure.  
These solutions are neither simple nor painless. But consumers 
deserve a better system. A future Grattan Institute report will 
produce recommendations for how that can be achieved.
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1. Electricity use is declining
1.1 The structure of the electricity industry 
Australia’s  electricity  system  contains  four  kinds  of  businesses  
that operate in different kinds of markets, as shown in Figure 1.1. 
x Power stations, owned by generation businesses, produce 
electricity. 
x Transmission businesses own the high-voltage  ‘poles  and  
wires’  that  carry  electricity  across large distances to local 
markets. 
x Distribution companies carry power across low-voltage 
networks to businesses and homes. Transmission and 
distribution companies are known as network businesses. 
x Electricity  retailers  manage  customers’  electricity  accounts 
and are responsible for buying enough power from 
generators to supply homes and businesses.  
The generators and retailers compete for business and are 
exposed to risk if the volume or price of electricity falls. In that way 
competition protects consumers.  But  it  doesn’t  make  economic  
sense to have multiple physical networks competing to deliver 
electricity, so network businesses have a monopoly. An 
independent regulator sets prices that should be fair for both 
network businesses and consumers. 
Figure 1.1: Electricity market: Power station to end user 
 
Source: Grattan Institute 
1.2 Trends in electricity consumption 
Since 2009-10, electricity consumption  in  Australia’s  largest  
interconnected electricity market, the National Electricity Market 
(NEM), has fallen by 4.5 per cent. This fall in electricity 
consumption is unprecedented.1 
                                            
1 AEMO (2013b) 
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The  NEM  is  an  interconnected  system  of  ‘poles  and  wires’  that  
delivers electricity to users in the southern and eastern states of 
Australia. It spans New South Wales and the Australian Capital 
Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria. 
Around 26 per cent of this power is sold to households, with the 
rest sold to commercial and industrial users.2 Figures 1.2 and 1.3 
show total energy supplied to the grid by generators. Electricity 
demand in the NEM reached an all-time high of 206,900 gigawatt 
hours in 2008-09. 3 By contrast for the year 2012-13, the total 
electricity demand was 193,500 gigawatt hours.4 
Figure 1.2 shows the fall in consumption by charting year-to-date 
electricity  use  in  the  NEM.  The  figure  shows  ‘sent  out’  electricity,  
which is the amount produced by power stations and transported 
through the network. 
The change in consumption patterns has not been confined to the 
NEM. The South West Interconnected System (SWIS) is 
Australia’s  second  largest  network  and  supplies  power  to  major  
population centres in the south-west of Western Australia. 
                                            
2 BREE (2013) 
3 The decline in total electricity demand exceeds the decline in final 
consumption. Electricity demand and final consumption figures may differ due 
to  transmission  and  distribution  losses  and  other  losses  such  as  the  ‘auxiliary  
load’  of  power  consumed  by generators. 
4 AEMO (2013b) 
Figure 1.2: NEM 12-month rolling total of electricity demand, 2005 
to 2013 
 
Source: AEMO (1998-2013) 
Western Australia has been in the midst of a resources boom, 
with growth in gross state product increasing at a rate of five per 
cent a year over the decade to June 2013.5  
Despite this, electricity use in the SWIS has been flat for the past 
several years, as Figure 1.3 shows. 
                                            
5 ABS (2013a) 
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Figure 1.3: SWIS 12-month rolling total of electricity demand, 2007 
to 2013 
 
Source: IMO (2013) 
Declining  electricity  use  is  new  for  Australia’s  power  sector. As 
Figure 1.4 shows, between 1961 and 2002 there was no year in 
which electricity consumption declined. 
Figure 1.4: Australian consumption of electricity, 1960 to 2012 
 
Note: BREE estimates of consumption include power supplied through the NEM 
and SWIS and from outside these networks. This data provides an indication of 
long-term trends in consumption but relies on a number of data sources. 
Source: BREE (2013) 
Nevertheless, a long-term trend of slowing growth in network 
electricity consumption is evident. As Figure 1.5 shows, over the 
past 50 years the rate of electricity growth has slowed. If the 
historical trend continues, energy consumption will enter a period 
of sustained contraction. 
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Figure 1.5: Growth in electricity consumption in Australia, 1961 to 
2012 
 
Note: BREE estimates of consumption include power supplied through the NEM and SWIS 
and from outside these networks. This data provides an indication of long-term trends in 
consumption but relies on a number of data sources. 
Source: BREE (2013) 
The 50-year decline in the electricity growth rate supports the 
view that the recent fall in electricity consumption is not simply a 
passing deviation from a long-term growth trend.  
The recent decline in consumption is a surprise. Even some 
market specialists did not anticipate it. The Australian Energy 
Market Operator (AEMO) releases annual forecasts of energy 
consumption. In its 2010 Electricity Statement of Opportunities, 
AEMO’s  medium-case forecast for electricity consumption in the 
NEM predicted consumption of 216,600 gigawatt hours in 
2012-13.6 The forecast implied an expected annual average 
growth rate of about three per cent a year from 2009-10 to 
2012-13. 
But in 2013, AEMO reported that actual consumption for 2012-13 
was 188,900 – suggesting electricity consumption from the NEM 
has actually fallen by about 1.6 per cent a year since 2009-10.7 
Forecasting demand is not easy and AEMO was not alone in 
failing to anticipate a number of factors that have contributed to 
the fall in demand. 
1.3 Reasons for falling consumption 
A comprehensive analysis of the causes of these electricity 
consumption patterns is beyond the scope of this report. Yet 
consumption trends need to be understood in order to appreciate 
why slow growth and even declining electricity use may be the 
new  normal  for  Australia’s  power  networks. 
In  June  2012,  Australia’s  Commonwealth  Government  
implemented an economy wide price on carbon emissions. It was 
estimated that the carbon price would increase household 
electricity bills by around nine per cent, which would provide 
                                            
6 AEMO (2010) 
7 AEMO (2013a) 
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consumers with an incentive to reduce their electricity 
consumption.8 
However,  the  declining  growth  of  electricity  demand  in  Australia’s  
power networks predates the introduction of the carbon price. As 
such, the trend in falling demand is likely to continue even if, as 
promised, the newly-elected Commonwealth Government repeals 
existing carbon pricing legislation. 
The effect of the carbon price on electricity demand is beyond the 
scope of this report. Falling demand is an issue that governments 
must address, irrespective of the policy mechanisms that will be 
used  to  meet  Australia’s  international  commitments  to  reduce  
carbon emissions. 
In homes around Australia, electricity consumption has been 
declining due to changes in consumer behaviour, more energy-
efficient appliances, and higher energy efficiency standards on 
new homes. Widespread uptake of rooftop solar systems has 
reduced the amount of electricity sourced from the power network. 
Improvements in the efficiency of appliances - in particular 
refrigerators, air conditioners and televisions - have contributed 
significantly to households consuming less energy. In part, this 
reflects changes in consumer attitudes. Recent increases in 
electricity prices, coupled with concerns about the effects of 
climate change, have made customers more conservative in their 
power use. 
                                            
8 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (2011) 
For  example,  the  Australian  Bureau  of  Statistics’  surveyed  
households in 2012 and found that 21 per cent intended to make 
an improvement to their home to improve energy efficiency. A 
year later, a follow-up survey found that 31 per cent of households 
had actually made an improvement – a higher percentage than 
had planned to make an improvement.9 
The increasing use of  ‘smart’  electricity  meters  has  also helped 
households to manage their power consumption. By providing 
consumers with more information on how they use power, smart 
meters can empower households to reduce their consumption. 
The reduction in household electricity consumption has also been 
influenced by government policies targeting the energy efficiency 
of appliances (see Box 1.1). For example, the Minimum Energy 
Performance Standards program specifies minimum levels of 
energy efficiency that appliances, lighting and electrical 
equipment must exceed before being offered for sale in Australia.  
Mandatory energy rating label requirements assist consumers to 
identify more energy efficient products.10 These standards are 
regularly reviewed to keep up with advances in technology. 
Savings from energy efficient lighting can substantially contribute 
to reducing household electricity use. Globally a fifth  of  electricity 
use is for lighting households, businesses and other 
organisations.11 Old incandescent light bulbs turn only two per 
cent of their power into light. Fluorescent lamps improve on the 
performance of incandescent globes, but modern LED (light-
                                            
9 ABS (2012) 
10 Equipment Energy Efficiency (2013) 
11 Kramer (2010) cited in Kim, et al. (2012)   
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emitting diode) lights use 80 per cent less power than an average 
fluorescent lamp.12 
Box 1.1: How changes in television technology cut power use 
Five years ago, a household buying a new television may have 
purchased a plasma screen television. Since that time the far 
more energy-efficient LCD (liquid-crystal display) and LED (light-
emitting diode) televisions have become increasingly popular.  
In 2009, the Commonwealth Government introduced efficiency 
and minimum energy performance requirements for televisions. 
Over the first 18 months of that program, the energy efficiency of 
new products improved by 20 per cent.  
About three million televisions are sold in Australia every year. By 
2011, the market was dominated by LCD and LED televisions, 
with plasma technology making up only 20 per cent of the market. 
As households begin to replace their old televisions, they will 
make significant energy savings.  
Origin has estimated that households can save up to $149 a year 
by replacing their two-star rated plasma TV with a five-star rated 
LCD television. 
For new homes and renovations, more stringent energy efficiency 
standards for building have helped to reduce electricity 
consumption. Following changes to the National Construction 
Code in 2010, state governments introduced mandatory six-star 
                                            
12 Ibid. 
efficiency ratings for new houses.13 Ratings are determined based 
on building materials, glazing and sealing of the building. The 
choice of domestic services - hot water, insulation and artificial 
lighting - are also considered as part of the rating.14 A house built 
to the 6-star standards will use roughly 20 to 25 per cent less 
energy on heating and cooling compared to a 5-star rated house 
of equivalent size.15 
In addition to changes inside the home, a rapid uptake of rooftop 
solar systems has reduced demand for electricity from the 
network. The number of rooftop solar systems has soared from 
about 8000 in 2007 to more than one million today.16 The main 
drivers of this rapid growth have been generous subsidies from 
state governments and the rapidly falling cost of rooftop solar 
modules.17  
Beyond households use, many businesses have also reduced 
power consumption in response to the same drivers of rising 
power prices and concerns about carbon emissions. Business 
leaders recognise that energy efficiency can drive significant cost 
savings, particularly in the context of rapidly rising prices.18 
Falling electricity consumption has also been the result of 
structural changes in the Australian economy. In particular, 
structural  changes  in  the  manufacturing  sector,  one  of  Australia’s  
most electricity-intensive sectors, have contributed to lower 
                                            
13 Commonwealth Government Department of Industry (2013) 
14 Australian Building Codes Board (2013) 
15 Western Australia Department of Commerce (2012) 
16 Climate Commission (2013) 
17 Ibid. 
18 Webb, et al. (2010) 
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electricity consumption. In total, the Australian manufacturing 
sector grew by 24 per cent between 1990 and 2013, but it did not 
keep pace with growth in the rest of the economy. Over the same 
period, the share of economic output attributable to the 
manufacturing sector declined from 13 per cent to six per cent.19  
The reduction of manufacturing output contributed to a decline in 
the electricity intensity of the Australian economy. As Figure 1.6 
shows, the amount of electricity used per unit of economic output 
in Australia reached a peak in the early 1990s and declined 
steadily over the two decades since.  
Changes in the types of manufacturing occurring in Australia have 
also led to the sector using less electricity. Over the past two 
decades, the sector has seen a substantial shift from labour 
intensive and low-skilled manufacturing, to higher-skilled 
sectors.20 This change has involved a shift away from some 
industries, such as aluminium production, which are very high 
users of electricity. 
For example, the Kurri Kurri aluminium smelter in the New South 
Wales Hunter Valley closed in 2012. This one facility closure 
removed around 300 megawatts of consumption – equivalent to 
around two per cent of electricity generation capacity in New 
South Wales.21 Other industrial plants that had been planned may 
no longer go ahead.22 AEMO consumption data suggests that 
electricity consumption by large industrial users fell by over four  
                                            
19 ABS (2013b) 
20 Minifie, et al. (2013) 
21 Orchison (2013) 
22 AEMO (2013b) 
Figure 1.6: Electricity consumption per dollar of gross domestic 
product 
 Source: ABS (2013b) and BREE (2013) 
per cent between 2011-12 and 2012-13.23 At the same time, 
existing manufacturing firms are using less electricity per unit of 
output.24 
 
                                            
23 AEMO (2012) & AEMO (2013b) 
24 Grattan analysis based on ABS (2013b) and BREE (2013) 
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2. Bad news for power bills
In conventional economics, when demand for a product declines, 
the market for that product is left oversupplied. In response, the 
price should fall as producers seek to sell their product and 
maintain profits. 
But the opposite has happened in  Australia’s  electricity  markets. 
As electricity consumption has fallen, electricity prices have 
continued to rise. In fact, after they grew in line with the rate of 
inflation for several decades, the rate of their growth has 
accelerated since about 2007, as Figure 2.1shows. 
The result is that users have been using less electricity, but 
paying higher bills. Between 2006 and 2013, the average 
Australian household reduced power consumption by more than 
seven per cent, from 6100 to 5600 kilowatt hours a year. Over the 
same period, the average annual household power bill increased 
by more than 85 per cent: from $890 to $1660 a year (in real 
terms in $2012-13, this is an increase of around 60 per cent from 
$1040 to $1660 per household).25 
                                            
25 Wood (2012) 
Figure 2.1: Rise in electricity prices in comparison to rise in CPI 
 
Source: ABS (2013c) 
Figure 2.2 shows how household power bills in both the NEM and 
the SWIS have continued to grow at an average rate of more than 
nine per cent a year, even as households have progressively 
used less power.  
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Figure 2.2: Average customer electricity use compared to average 
annual customer bill 
 
Source: Grattan analysis based on AEMO (1998-2013), IMO (2013), ABS 
(2013c) and BREE (2013) 
2.1 Why are bills rising? 
The reason electricity bills have grown in the face of falling 
consumption lies in the structure of the electricity market and the 
way it is regulated. The final price customers pay for electricity 
through their power bills has three parts. Customers pay for the 
cost of generating electricity at a power station (including the cost 
of compliance with environmental regulations and climate change 
policies), the cost to transport electricity through the transmission 
and distribution networks, and a retail margin. The last is the cost 
paid to retailers for buying electricity on behalf of customers and 
managing  customers’  accounts. 
Generators face competition 
Electricity generators and retail businesses both operate in 
competitive markets. Therefore, the prices these businesses 
receive fall in response to falling electricity demand. As 
consumers use less electricity, power stations produce less. 
Figure 2.3 shows how wholesale price of electricity (the price paid 
to power stations) has decreased as electricity demand in the 
NEM has fallen. 
The biggest losers have been black coal power stations. In the 
past few months, two large, state-owned black coal generators in 
New South Wales, the Bayswater and Liddell power stations, 
have operated at around 60 and 45 per cent capacity, 
respectively.26 In 2008-09, their average operating loads were 
about 65 per cent of capacity.27 
 
                                            
26 Pitt&Sherry (2013) 
27 Macquarie Generation (2009) 
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Figure 2.3: NEM electricity consumption, network revenue per unit 
sold, and wholesale electricity price, 2005-06 to 2012-13 
 
Note: *Real wholesale prices are adjusted for the carbon price in 2012-13 
Source: Grattan Analysis based on AEMO (1998-2013) and regulatory 
determinations. 
The cost of such redundant power generation capacity may be 
substantial. AGL, a large power retailer and generator, has 
estimated that the NEM has more than 9000 megawatts of excess 
power generation capacity – around a sixth of the market 
capacity.28 When prices fall, leading to potential loss in value of 
power stations, it is the asset owners who carry the risk.  
Network businesses do not 
Businesses responsible for transmission and distribution – known 
as network businesses - are different. They are regulated 
monopolies. A regulator determines how much revenue each is 
permitted to earn. In the NEM, that is the Australian Energy 
Regulator; in  Western  Australia’s  SWIS,  the  Economic  Regulation  
Authority. 
The regulator determines the revenue the network businesses are 
allowed to collect over a five-year period. It makes the calculation 
based on the companies’ existing infrastructure, required 
investments in new infrastructure and other operating costs. To 
collect the allowed revenue, the businesses set prices, which 
generally include both a small fixed charge and a charge that 
varies with consumption. When power consumption falls, network 
businesses do not drop their prices but may actually increase 
them, to ensure they collect the allowed amount of revenue. In 
that case, the cost of falling consumption is borne by other users 
of the network, not the companies. 
For example, if a large industrial customer closes a factory, the 
network charges that were being paid by that business would 
have to be recovered from other users of the network, who would 
pay more.  
                                            
28 AGL (2013) 
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Falling consumption has made a moderate contribution to price 
rises in recent years, but its contribution to future price rises could 
grow substantially. 
A bigger problem over the last decade is that some network 
businesses have spent too much on their network assets. At the 
same time, their allowed returns have been higher than they 
should have been. Grattan  Institute’s  2012  report,  Putting the 
customer back in front shows how regulatory incentives for 
network businesses have led to excessive investment. 29  Better 
incentives, particularly for state government-owned distribution 
businesses in New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania, 
could lead to lower spending on networks and save household 
customers around $100 a year. 
In recent years, these factors have combined to drive electricity 
cost increases. Figure 2.4 shows how the average amount of 
revenue per unit of energy sold in each state has increased, in 
real terms, between 2005-06 and 2012-13. 
Under  the  regulatory  arrangements  governing  Australia’s  power  
networks, the owners of transmission and distribution businesses 
do not bear the risk of falling asset prices as a result of lower 
levels of electricity consumption. Power users carry the risk, in the 
form of higher bills.  
In other words, the impact of falling electricity consumption on 
these regulated businesses is not just a problem for the 
businesses themselves. It is a critical issue for keeping power 
prices low, and it is therefore a critical issue for governments. 
                                            
29 Wood (2012) 
Figure 2.4: Average revenue per kilowatt hour of electricity sold by 
state, between 2005-06 and 2012-13 ($2012-13) 
 
Note: Caution should be taken when interpreting changes in Tasmania. Due to data 
limitations we have assumed constant revenue for Aurora Energy. 
Source: Grattan Analysis based on AEMO (1998-2013), IMO (2013) and regulatory 
determinations (see References for regulatory determinations) 
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3. The problem for networks
The regulations that govern what transmission and distribution 
businesses can charge consumers are designed to prevent the 
former taking advantage of their position as monopoly 
businesses. In the NEM and the SWIS, businesses are allowed to 
recover the costs they incur to build and maintain the power 
network, plus earn a return on their investment.  
Regulated asset owners therefore face very little commercial risk. 
Accordingly, the returns they are allowed to earn are low relative 
to the returns of businesses that do face commercial market risks. 
When electricity use was consistently growing, these 
arrangements worked quite well. The value of a network 
business’s  infrastructure – known as the regulated asset base – 
would increase each year to reflect new investment. 
In the past, as electricity use grew, the businesses would build 
more assets to accommodate growth. Because this cost was 
shared over a higher volume of consumption, there was no real 
increase in the price of electricity. 
Falling electricity use, however, creates serious problems for the 
regulatory model. In particular, the arrangements do not cope well 
with the mismatch between rising asset values and falling 
consumption. Further, changes in the way that customers are 
using electricity mean that some users are not paying a fair share 
of the rising costs. 
3.1 Peak demand and the risk of redundant assets 
If electricity consumption is falling, then some of the assets that 
network businesses have built to meet past usage needs may 
become redundant. 
The  ‘capacity’  of  a  network  is  the  amount  of electricity it can carry 
at any point in time. Because networks do not store electricity, 
they must have sufficient capacity to deliver power to meet 
customers’ needs at the point when electricity use is at its highest. 
This  point  is  called  ‘peak  demand’, and it is critical to the running 
of the electricity system. 
If the network has insufficient capacity to meet peak demand, the 
system is likely to fail and cause blackouts. Blackouts are 
expensive, and extremely unpopular with businesses and 
residential customers. They damage the reputations of power 
companies. Because they are most likely to occur at times of peak 
demand, the electricity network must be built to deliver power at 
any moment through the year as if it were the annual half hour of 
peak demand. 
In most Australian states, that half hour comes on a hot weekday 
evening in summer, when factories and businesses have not yet 
shut for the day, people are switching on air conditioners and 
other appliances, and output from rooftop solar systems is low. 
(An exception is Tasmania, where milder summers and colder 
winters mean that peak demand usually occurs in winter, when a 
lot of users are simultaneously running heaters.) 
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Peak demand defines how much infrastructure - poles, wires, 
transformers and transmission stations - a network business 
needs to install. This, in turn, is a major determinant of the amount 
that a network business must spend, which in turn determines the 
prices charged to customers. 
In each state of the NEM, peak demand levels reached historical 
high points at some time between 2008-09 and 2010-11, and 
declined by 2012-13. In Western Australia, peak demand grew 
until 2011-12, but declined in 2012-13 
Figure 4 shows how peak demand for the 2012-13 year compares 
to historical peaks in each state of Australia. The fall in peak 
demand ranged from three per cent in Western Australia to more 
than ten per cent in Tasmania. 
Analysing peak demand patterns is harder than analysing 
consumption trends. Peak demand occurs at different times in 
different locations and this has different implications at different 
levels of the network. While transmission businesses only need to 
equip their big power lines to carry enough power to meet the total 
level of peak demand, distribution businesses must ensure that 
they can deliver a peak load to every street in the network. 
Also, because peak demand is typically recorded on one day in 
summer, data can be strongly influenced by extreme 
weather - unusually hot temperatures in a given year can distort 
the data. Yet it is unlikely the decline in 2012-13 can be attributed 
to an abnormally cool summer period. Each of the three summer 
months from December 2012 to February 2013 recorded 
temperatures above the long-term average and January 2013 was 
the hottest January on record.30 
Figure 3.1: Shortfall in 2012-13 peak demand levels, relative to 
historical peaks 
 
Source: Grattan Analysis based on AEMO (1998-2013) and IMO (2013) 
 
The problem with falling peak demand is that it may leave 
networks with excess capacity. The current value of regulated  
                                            
30 Bureau of Meterology (2012); Bureau of Meterology (2013a); Bureau of 
Meterology (2013b) 
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assets in the NEM and the SWIS is around $86.9 billion. If the fall 
in peak demand in each state is applied to the value of assets, it 
suggests that our major power networks may already contain 
around $4.9 billion in excess assets. 
 
                                            
31 Cain, et al. (2010); ibid. 
 
These assets are neither wanted nor needed, but they are costing 
consumers about $444 million a year. 
Box 3.1: Using the network more efficiently: why electric 
vehicles could be a game changer 
Peak demand is a major driver of network costs. Network 
businesses must build enough assets to supply every home and 
business on the day of the year when electricity demand is at its 
maximum. This means that the network must build assets that 
will be surplus to requirements for 364 days of the year. 
For this reason, technologies that help to reduce peak demand 
can materially reduce the amount that needs to be spent in the 
network. Further, if electricity consumption increases during off-
peak periods, these users can share the cost of paying for the 
network, without increasing the cost to build and maintain it. 
While the widespread take-up of electric vehicles might seem a 
long way away, they have an enormous potential to help 
network operators use our power system more efficiently. This 
could  be  a  game  changer  for  Australia’s  power  system. 
The first benefit of electric vehicles would come from shifting 
energy consumption from liquid fuels to electricity. This could 
reverse the trend of falling electricity consumption. As well, 
 
 
giving owners of electric vehicles incentives to charge 
vehicles at off-peak times - such as overnight – could lead 
to a higher volume of electricity sales but have a much 
smaller impact on the level of peak demand. 31 This could 
drive down electricity prices.  
There is also potential to use electric vehicles to actively 
reduce peak demand levels. Electric vehicles that are 
connected to a charging station during a peak demand 
period could have their batteries drawn down to help 
provide power to the network. Having this capacity could 
reduce the need for network businesses to expand the 
electricity network to cope with high usage periods, which 
could also help to lower power prices.  
It is difficult to predict if or when consumers may use 
electric vehicles in sufficient quantities to help manage peak 
demand. Accordingly, governments cannot rely on this type 
of technology to resolve the issues associated with falling 
consumption. 
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3.2 The need for new assets 
A further challenge for networks is that at the same time as 
electricity consumption is declining, a number of changes to the 
network may force network businesses to invest more. 
In response to the 2009 bushfires, the Victorian Government 
established the Powerline Bushfire Safety Taskforce to address 
the risk of bushfires being ignited by faulty power lines. In 
December 2011, the state government accepted a package of 
recommendations from the taskforce that is expected to cost 
about $700 million over ten years.32 The risk of fire must be 
addressed, but replacing electrical protection devices and power 
lines will add to the costs that network businesses pass on to 
customers. 
Other costs are also driving up network  businesses’  prices. The 
Victorian  government’s  rollout  of  ‘smart’  electricity  meters  was  a  
significant upgrade of metering infrastructure but cost consumers 
more than two billion dollars.33 
Increased uptake of solar systems also means that some 
distribution businesses may need to modify or upgrade equipment 
to deal with power flowing from homes to the power system at 
certain times, rather than the other way around.  
The legitimate need for network upgrades creates a challenge for 
the governments and policymakers that must approve the funds. 
While upgrades and improved safety standards may be needed, 
                                            
32 SP AusNet (2012) 
33 Australian Associated Press (2011) 
money spent on the network must be recovered from a 
diminishing pool of electricity sales. 
3.3 Problems with cross-subsidisation 
Finally, falling demand poses a challenge for the way that 
distribution and transmission businesses charge customers for 
use of their power networks. 
The spending on assets of distribution and transmission 
businesses is closely tied to the level of peak demand in the 
network. Yet most customers are not charged a tariff that reflects 
how much they contribute to the network’s  peak demand level. 
For many years some large commercial and industrial customers 
have paid a significant portion of their bills based on their peak 
use, to account for the large load they put on the network.  
Residential  customers’  bills, however, are almost entirely charged 
at a variable rate. That is, customers pay a set price per kilowatt 
hour of electricity they use throughout the year. The bill is 
calculated  by  multiplying  this  price  by  the  customers’  total  
electricity consumption.  
So while the cost of the network is driven by peak demand, 
consumers’  share  of  the  cost  is  based  on  consumption. Therefore 
they have little incentive to use less power at peak times, which 
would help networks manage costs.   
In the past, the types of electricity meter that were installed at 
customers’  homes  made  it  necessary  to  charge  customers  based  
on consumption. Older style meters were not able to measure a 
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households’  peak  consumption  level.  It was also implicitly 
assumed that all households had similar electricity use patterns, 
making a  household’s  use a good proxy for its peak demand. 
Now, improvements in electricity meters make it possible to 
charge customers based on how much they contribute to peak 
load. Further, recent developments in residential electricity 
consumption are making it increasingly necessary to charge 
customers based on peak demand. 
How air conditioners changed the game 
Air conditioners were the first technology to dramatically change 
how different households contribute to peak energy costs. They 
are not used often, but their use on hot summer afternoons can 
add significantly to peak load. That means a lot of households 
installing air conditioners can add substantially to the peak 
demand of a network, and therefore to its cost.  
However, these households do not pay the full cost of their 
contribution to peak demand because a household installing an 
air conditioner only increases its overall electricity consumption by 
a relatively small amount. As a result, the amount the consumer 
adds to network costs can far exceed the cost of the appliance. A 
report by the Committee for Economic Development of Australia 
noted that air conditioners purchased for $1,500 frequently 
impose a $7,000 cost on the energy system when their 
contribution to peak demand is factored in.34 
                                            
34 CEDA (2012) 
About a decade ago, a rapid decline in the cost of air conditioners 
substantially increased their uptake and contributed to increases 
in peak demand.35 In the decade to 2008, the rate of air 
conditioner ownership in Australia doubled to about 65 per cent of 
households.36 
The rise of rooftop solar 
More recently, increasing use of rooftop solar generators has also 
exacerbated the problem of using variable charges to recover 
network costs. A high penetration of rooftop solar systems can 
affect the amount of electricity flowing through a local network, as 
Figure 3.2 shows for a residential area in Queensland.  
The problem is that high penetration of rooftop solar systems 
reduces consumption of electricity from the network but may not 
reduce use at the peak times that drive the cost of the network. 
This means higher costs for customers.  
Consider the example of the Queensland local network shown in 
the chart above. The total amount of energy supplied to 
customers through the network has decreased substantially over 
the past five years. Yet the daily peak demand – the high point 
that  occurs  around  6  o’clock  in  the  evening – has not fallen. 
The result is that owners of rooftop solar are able to reduce the 
amount they pay for network charges, because they reduce their 
overall electricity use. 
                                            
35 EnergyConsult (2010) 
36 Energy  Efficient  Strategies  (2008) 
Shock to the system: dealing with falling electricity demand 
Grattan Institute 2013 19 
Figure 3.2: The electrical current flowing through a Queensland 
feeder in an area with increasing rooftop solar penetration  
 
Note: The current on this electrical line was measured each year for five consecutive years 
on the second Tuesday in October. 
Source: Energex (2013) 
Yet the  network  businesses’  costs  will  not  fall because the peak 
demand level has not changed. In fact, the costs to service this 
area may actually increase as infrastructure upgrades may be 
required to accommodate the flow of electricity from solar systems 
back onto the network.  
In this case, the network business is still able to recover its costs 
under existing regulatory arrangements. But someone must pay. 
Power prices will go up to account for the fall in total energy 
consumption and cover the cost of required network upgrades. 
The structure of variable charges means that rising prices will 
prevent households that install solar panels from saving as much 
money as they had expected to save. But other users of the 
network will be hit harder. They will be forced to pay higher prices, 
without having the same means as solar panel owners to reduce 
their consumption. 
In effect, because networks are allowed to charge revenue based 
on a fixed cost but individual residential consumers pay at 
variable rates, rooftop solar systems implicitly receive a subsidy 
on their network costs from other power users. This subsidy is on 
top of explicit subsidies that solar system owners may also 
receive, such as solar feed-in tariffs. 
3.4 The  risk  of  a  ‘death  spiral’ 
In the short run, power users have limited capacity to reduce their 
consumption. A household can buy more efficient appliances and 
use them less often. A business can adopt  ‘best  practice’  
approaches to reducing power use. But beyond these measures, 
it is difficult to reduce consumption further with current technology. 
Over the longer term, the rising cost of electricity and expectation 
of even higher prices in future will drive more consumers to buy 
more energy efficient televisions, refrigerators or air conditioners 
when their appliances need to be replaced, or to install home 
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insulation to reduce heating and cooling costs. People are also 
likely to build more energy efficient houses.37 
Because of the way Australia’s  power  networks  are allowed to 
recover their costs, such efficiency measures can actually 
increase the price of power. As consumers reduce their electricity 
use, the same amount of revenue is recovered over fewer units of 
electricity being sold. Therefore, prices must rise. 
Some large industrial users are also consuming less energy. The 
closure of large industrial plants – the Kurri Kurri aluminium 
smelter in 2012, for example – means that other users must pay 
more in power charges to allow network businesses to earn their 
revenue. 
For residential customers, rapid uptake of air conditioners has 
increased peak load on the network and pushed up prices for 
other users. By allowing some users to reduce the amount they 
pay in network charges without reducing the costs they impose on 
the network, rooftop solar has also pushed up prices. 
All these changes give customers even more incentives to reduce 
consumption. The possible long-term result is a ‘death  spiral’. 
The  ‘death  spiral’  is  a  term  used  to  describe  the  situation  where  
declining demand, technology changes and rising prices may 
interact in a way that induces large numbers of consumers to 
                                            
37 Garnaut (2011) 
disconnect from the network. In that case the whole funding 
model of Australia’s  regulated power networks is under threat.38 
In this scenario, falling demand keeps pushing up power prices. 
At the same time, new technologies provide consumers with 
alternatives to using power from the networks. For example, 
customers could install larger rooftop solar systems and battery 
storage systems that allow them to disconnect entirely from the 
power network. 
As growing numbers of users disconnect, consumption would fall 
and prices rise further, and the vicious circle this creates would 
increase the incentive for other users to leave the network. 
Networks could be left with billions worth of unused assets. 
Governments would face intense pressure to help bear the cost 
and consumers would face the cost and inconvenience of 
managing  a  ‘stand-alone’  power  system in their business or 
home.  
  
                                            
38 Simhauser and Nelson (2012) 
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4. Policy implications
The  ‘death  spiral’  is  not  inevitable. Rather, it describes what could 
happen if the way electricity networks are priced and regulated 
does not change. 
Preventing the death spiral is in the interests of all parties. For 
networks, it is critical to the viability of their business models. 
For consumers, network costs have been the major cause of high 
electricity bills. A death spiral could lead to even higher electricity 
bills in the short term as the fixed cost of the network is spread 
among fewer users. In the longer term, large-scale disconnections 
from the network could lock in a higher overall cost for electricity 
than could be supplied through an efficient network. 
In that scenario, policy makers would be caught in the middle. On 
the one hand, loss of asset values could mean pressure on 
governments to compensate network owners.  
On the other hand, the cost of an asset write-down would be 
borne by taxpayers where governments own the business and by 
shareholders where they have been privatised. Neither party 
would welcome this result.  
Policy reforms in three areas are required to prevent the death 
spiral from occurring and to produce more efficient outcomes for 
the electricity system. The first two seek to stop matters from 
getting worse. The last considers what to do about redundant 
assets created by falling demand. 
4.1 Ensuring cost efficient power networks 
Lowering network costs to economically efficient levels would 
reduce price pressure on businesses and households. By making 
power from the network cheaper, it reduces the incentive for 
customers to disconnect.  
Grattan  Institute’s  2012  report,  Putting the customer back in front, 
examines four policy priorities that would, on average, save 
Australian households about $100 per year by reducing the 
element of their bills paid to distribution businesses.39 Falling 
electricity demand makes the need for these reforms even more 
urgent. 
The report recommends that to reduce electricity charges driven 
by the high cost of distribution services, governments should:  
x Empower the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) to set the 
rates of return earned by network business at a lower level, to 
better reflect the low levels of risk faced by these businesses. 
x Transfer responsibility for setting reliability standards from 
state governments to the Australian Energy Regulator, and 
make improvements to network reliability subject to a cost 
benefit test. 
                                            
39 Wood (2012) 
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x Reduce the risk of overinvestment in network assets through 
implementing annual reviews of distribution businesses’  
capital expenditure forecasts. 
x Improve the corporate governance of government-owned 
network businesses, or privatise these businesses, to ensure 
they operate as efficiently as those that are privately owned. 
In the past year some progress has been made on these issues. 
The Australian Energy Regulator has released new guidelines for 
setting fairer rates  of  return  under  its  ‘Better  Regulation’  reform  
program. The program is also running work streams to assess 
some of the issues leading to overinvestment in networks.  
The program, however, does not address the fact that network 
businesses have little incentive to reduce their investment in 
response to falling peak demand. This is important because these 
businesses are best placed to forecast future demand 
requirements and invest in new infrastructure accordingly.  
Under current regulations, network businesses have the incentive 
to build more infrastructure assets, and the customer bears all the 
risk if they become redundant. If companies carried some of the 
risk of falling demand, however, they would have stronger 
incentives to avoid over-building. In exchange, companies may 
expect the rate of return on these assets to be adjusted to reflect 
a higher level of risk. Regulators should explore this trade-off. 
In relation to the second priority reform set out in  Grattan’s  2012  
report, in September the Australian Energy Market Commission 
released a Review of the national framework for distribution 
reliability. In the past governments have intervened to ensure that 
state-owned network businesses deliver power at levels of 
reliability that no serious cost-benefit analysis can justify. The 
result is higher power bills. The Review recommends a 
cost-benefit test for reliability improvements, and separating the 
bodies responsible for providing reliability from those responsible 
for setting reliability targets.40  
More recently, the Commonwealth Government has revived 
discussion about the privatisation of electricity networks by 
offering state governments financial incentives to privatise these 
businesses.41 
All these steps could improve the governance and regulatory 
arrangements of network businesses. Yet regulatory reform can 
be slow. Regulators and policy makers must focus on delivering 
results, and not get embroiled in managing the process. 
4.2 Ensuring efficient network tariffs 
Consumers are faced with an increasing array of choices for how 
they source and consume electricity. These include the option to 
generate electricity on-site, rather than sourcing it all through the 
network. 
The combination of rising prices and increasing  use  of  ‘smart’  
electricity meters are giving consumers both the incentive and the 
means to better manage their electricity consumption. Consumers 
are increasingly empowered to make informed trade-offs. For 
example, to save money on running costs, a household may 
                                            
40 AEMC (2013) 
41 Australian Associated Press (2013) 
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decide to spend more money to buy an energy efficient 
refrigerator, air conditioner or television. 
Policy makers cannot predict how technology will change 
electricity markets in the future. Battery storage, electric vehicles 
and ‘smart  appliances’  that  change  their  usage  patterns  in  
response to the needs of the electricity system are all on the 
horizon. 
Consumers should be given more ways to manage their electricity 
use. But policy makers should address deficiencies in existing 
tariff structures that enable and encourage some customers to 
reduce their electricity costs at the expense of others.  
The introduction of tariffs that more accurately reflect the cost of 
building and running the system will lead to more economically 
efficient decisions by consumers. Grattan Institute Energy 
Program’s  next report will make recommendations on how this 
objective can be achieved. Two broad avenues, set out here, will 
be considered. 
Network tariffs linked to peak demand, or peak customer use 
Ideally,  customers’  tariffs  for  using  the  power  network  would 
reflect their use at the time of peak demand, rather than their 
overall level of consumption. This type of peak demand charge 
would  make  customers’  bills  more  reflective  of  the  costs  they  
impose the network and provide an incentive to reduce 
consumption at peak times. However, while theoretically the most 
attractive option, this type of charge could be prohibitively difficult 
to implement. 
A simpler alternative, which reflects but does not fully capture the 
costs of peak demand, would be to charge users based on their 
own peak level of energy use.  
A move to demand-based tariffs would be a big change for 
consumers. Those who installed rooftop solar systems or large air 
conditioners may regard such tariffs as unfair because they would 
lead respectively to either lower savings or higher bills. Yet this is 
the inevitable and correct answer to the current subsidy problem. 
Clearly, demand-based tariffs will require electricity meters that 
can measure a  household’s  peak  demand.  
Network charges geared to peak demand would also reduce the 
incentive for customers to reduce their overall power consumption 
during non-peak periods. This could encourage customers to use 
more power, and slow the trend of falling electricity demand. As a 
consequence, this could increase carbon emissions from the 
electricity sector, which have been declining since 2009.42  
However, high electricity prices are a blunt tool for reducing 
carbon emissions. A more efficient strategy for managing 
emissions is through a carbon price that encourages lower 
emission electricity generation and the adoption of less 
emission-intensive industry practices. 
Increased use of location-based pricing 
The value of certain types of technologies may be greater in 
different locations. Consider a household in a growing suburb 
                                            
42 CCA (2013) 
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where the peak demand period occurs during daylight hours. In 
this area, having a group of households install rooftop solar 
systems could be of value to the power system, as it could reduce 
pressure  to  build  more  ‘poles  and  wires’  to  meet  the  growing  peak  
demand requirement. 
Conversely, for a household in an established area with falling 
peak demand and a peak demand period that typically occurs 
after nightfall, rooftop solar would be of little value to the network. 
The presence of location-specific incentives is not reflected in 
existing network tariff structures. Their use could encourage 
customers to make more efficient decisions about how they 
source and use electricity. Again, the benefits and costs need to 
be fully explored. 
4.3 Writing down network values 
Keeping down network costs will help to keep electricity prices low 
and improve the competitiveness of electricity supplied through 
power networks against technologies that could allow consumers 
to bypass the network. Making tariffs reflect the cost of peak 
demand would provide the right pricing signals for consumers to 
change their electricity consumption. 
However, these measures may not be enough. 
The amount  consumers  are  charged  for  using  Australia’s  
regulated power networks reflects the cost of previous 
investments. At present, consumers have no choice but to pay for 
these assets. However, in future they may have means to avoid 
doing so – through disconnecting from the network and installing 
rooftop solar combined with battery storage, for example. If 
networks were to lose significant numbers of customers in this 
way, spiralling prices would make their business unsustainable.  
A better alternative would involve writing down the value of 
network assets. This would mean recognising the need for 
networks to compete with non-network alternatives and reducing 
the value of the regulated asset base accordingly.  
If this were to occur, governments would need to decide who 
would pay for the asset write-downs. This is not a simple decision, 
and one that could be faced on multiple occasions in a range of 
jurisdictions. Consumption and peak demand are likely to 
continue to fall, and with them the value of the network assets. 
The cost of asset write-downs will be borne by one of three 
players: 
x Consumers, already paying for overvalued networks through 
high electricity tariffs, could pay even more. In the first 
instance, they would pay through higher prices. If prices 
reached unsustainable levels, customers disconnecting from 
the network could also be forced to pay substantial 
disconnection charges. This would cover the cost of network 
assets that may be made redundant as a result of a large 
number of disconnections, but such charges would highly 
unpopular. 
x Private owners of network businesses in South Australia and 
Victoria could be forced to write down the value of their 
regulated assets. Existing regulatory frameworks do not 
envision this prospect, and the risk may not be reflected in the 
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rates of return paid to the businesses. Such write-downs could 
be seen as a real sovereign risk and deter future investment in 
Australian infrastructure. It could also greatly increase the 
price that would have to be paid to attract investors. 
x Governments that own network businesses in New South 
Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia could 
be forced to write down the value of their regulated assets. In 
Victoria and South Australia governments could pay 
compensation to privately owned businesses. In either case, 
taxpayers would bear the cost.  
Whatever solution is found, implementing changes in a timely 
manner will help to manage the transition and ultimately reduce 
the cost of any fall in the carrying value of assets. 
Future Grattan Institute research will explore the relative merits of 
alternatives with a view to providing policy recommendations. 
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